

Document No. 4

Security Information

NO CHANGE in Class. ☒

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Class. CHANGED TO: TS S C

16 April 1952

DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77

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Date: 21 MAR 1978 By: 026

TO: Assistant Director, Office of Collection and Dissemination

FROM: [REDACTED] Organization and Methods Examiner

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SUBJECT: Report on the Executive Registry Top Secret Control System

1. PROBLEM: Review of operating methods of the Executive Registry for the purpose of insuring compliance with basic Agency regulations and establishing uniform operating methods throughout CIA. The Executive Registry is the area control office for Top Secret material received and dispatched by the Office of the Director, DD/CI, DD/I, DD/P, DD/A, and the Inspector General.

2. INCLUSIVE SURVEY DATES: 15-16 April 1952

a. Area Top Secret Control Officer:
Alternate Top Secret Control Officer
Assistant Top Secret Control Officers:

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3. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

a. Obvious Departures from the Basic Agency System:

(1) Separate logs are maintained for each type of TS material processed by the Executive Registry as follows: IAC, OIC, Daily Digest, DIB, NIE, SE, MSC, Projects, documents originated in the ER area, and other CIA material. All of these logs, excepting the CIA log, are maintained in numerical rather than "date of issuance" order. While this constitutes some slight handicap to the Central TSCO in its follow-up function, it eliminates the necessity in ER for a numerical card index for location purposes. The ER has agreed to center the date of transactions on the CIA log, which will assist the Central Office somewhat.

(2) Executive Registry has been listing both internal and external distribution in the final column of the log sheet. Since Central TSCO is concerned with only external

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distribution, it was suggested in the interest of speed and efficiency that ER should list internal distribution beneath the subject, and reserve the final column for external distribution. The Area TSCO agreed that this would be done in the future.

(3) Executive Registry frequently lists the names of individuals in the distribution column rather than office symbols. The examiner requested that in the interest of clarity to the Central TSCO office symbols should be used. The Area TSCO agreed to do this in the future.

(4) The various offices serviced by the Executive Registry do not have assistant TSCO's to receive and transmit documents within their own immediate areas. These people have not received indoctrination as to Top Secret control procedures and depend entirely on the Executive Registry for preparation of cover sheets, document and courier receipts, etc. Also in most cases they do not sign for documents received from the Executive Registry.

(5) Material originated in this Area for dispatch to field stations abroad are controlled by an internal log (copy of which does not go to Central TSCO) and are identified by a special symbol. The only record of these documents outside ER is an entry on the ER log (which goes to CTSCO) of the CIA control number and the special symbol. Also, the Executive Registry does not receive a document receipt from the field station until approximately two months after dispatch of the document. [REDACTED] OSO.

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(6) Cover sheets are in most instances removed from TS documents after leaving Executive Registry for internal dissemination and return to ER without having been signed by the officials seeing the document. ER holds these cover sheets for attachment to the pertinent document when it returns.

b. Security Hazards:

(1) Hand-carrying of TS material without recourse to Area control channels seems to be prevalent in this area. The techniques used by Executive Registry to combat this problem has been to solicit the cooperation of other control Areas in advising that a document from ER has arrived in that Area.

(2) Detachment of cover sheets from TS documents breaks the continuity of control.

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(3) The examiner believes that the lapse of time between dispatch of TS material to field stations and return of a signed receipt constitutes a security hazard.

c. General Problems:

Multiple numbering of documents from outside agencies is a problem of this Area as many of the documents received here are also sent to other Areas of CIA. ER considered the examiner's proposal of central control for such documents to be a practical solution to the problem.

4. CONCLUSIONS:

a. The examiner was accorded every courtesy and cooperation in making the review of the Executive Registry. The personnel were receptive to suggestions which would assist both ER and the Central TSCO and stated that they would welcome assistance in solving their internal control problems.

b. The work of the Executive Registry has been divided among the personnel in what the examiner considers an excellent operational break-down. This division of work is flexible to provide for fluctuations in workload and personnel absences.

c. The major problems requiring solution are considered by the examiner to be: (1) establishment of a uniform internal control system and indoctrination of clerical and stenographic personnel; and (2) enlistment of the support and understanding of officials as to the necessity for controls and their cooperation in the maintenance of such controls.

5. ACTION RECOMMENDED:

a. The examiner will present to the addressee within the next few days a proposed procedures manual which, if approved, will establish uniform operating procedures for Top Secret controls both within and between CIA Area Top Secret Control Offices. This manual will be presented in sufficient detail to be used as a training guide for clerical and stenographic personnel in the offices serviced by the Executive Registry. The examiner believes that implementation of these procedures will result in stricter controls in the individual offices and will relieve the Executive Registry of many of the problems arising from hand-carrying of documents, failure of offices to prepare cover sheets, document receipts, etc.

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b. In cases where TS material pouched to field stations is also distributed to CIA Areas, it is suggested that the ER log should indicate such internal distribution on its log.

c. It is also suggested that, for security reasons, the Executive Registry should arrange for a more prompt return of receipts from field stations.


d. Cognizance of the problem of obtaining signatures on cover sheets should be taken at a higher level than the Executive Registry as this is obviously a problem to be solved with the officials directly. The same statement applies to the problem of hand-carrying of documents without recourse to control channels although this problem can be partially alleviated by installation of an internal control system.

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CONCURRENCES:


CIA Top Secret Control Officer

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W. L. Peel
Chief, Organization and Methods Service